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"All that I aim at is, that there may remain for the benefit of 
this present age, as well as of posterity, some certain records and 
monuments of the first beginnings and fatal progress of [the Irish] 
rebellion [of 1641], together with the horrid cruelties most 
unmercifully exercised by the Irish rebels upon the British and 
protestants within this kingdom of Ireland." 
Sir John Temple, Knight, Master of the Rolls, and member of the 
Privy Council within the Kingdom of Ireland, 1646. 
With this statement, Sir John Temple forever shaped the history of Ireland and the Irish 
people. His words, documenting the Irish rebellion of 1641, acted as a critically important voice 
in justifying the horrific and brutal repression of the rebellion. Even beyond that, Temple’s 
coverage of the Irish uprising, particularly its beginnings in Ulster province, influenced the 
English government’s policies towards Ireland and the English people’s animosity towards the 
Irish for generations. Considering the long-lasting, far-reaching impact of Temple’s works and 
his statement that he wanted only to create “some certain records…of [the] rebellion” and only 
“for the benefit of [the] present age, as well as of [its] posterity,” it is a deep misfortune of 
history that such an influential work was so horribly misleading. Temple’s English bias 
throughout his coverage of the uprising created a picture that was terribly skewed and no doubt 
to the long misunderstanding in English society of the Irish people’s motives for and actions in 
rebelling. Worse still, Temple’s work can still misinform contemporary readers about the events 
of the 1641 revolt if they are not careful to examine this work explicitly within its context. When 
placed within its greater historical context, Temple’s work is an invaluable tool for examining 
any number of historical subjects, including the history of English-Irish relations. Therefore, one 
must examine all of Temple’s claims against the Irish and the relevant background information 
of the time to determine what nuggets of truth are buried underneath the layers of Temple’s 
nationalistic and religious prejudices. 
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An Englishman born in Ireland, Temple served in various political positions there from 
the 1640s to the 1650s. He was sometimes an unpopular and controversial figure; in 1643, James 
Butler, the Marquis of Ormond, forcibly removed Temple from his position as a Member of 
Parliament and imprisoned him for supporting the English parliament over the king, Charles II.1 
However, his most influential legacy emerged because of the Ulster rebellion in 1641. Temple 
resided in Ireland during the time of the uprising, and it left a deep and lasting imprint on his 
view of the native Irish. Indeed, the Ulster uprising inspired him to write his four hundred and 
twelve page account of the rebellion five years after the event. Temple used his position as 
master of the rolls in 1646 to gain access to various sources concerning the insurrection, 
including the 3,140 sworn depositions taken from Protestant survivors of Irish attacks. 2 These 
depositions would form the core of his History of the General Rebellion in Ireland. One of the 
few contemporary accounts of the Ulster rising, Temple’s History became the official 
interpretation of events for English readers, and it was considered key evidence of the 
untrustworthiness of the Catholic Irish.  
There are, however, serious problems with the History, including the fact that it was 
intended to gain support for the use of military force in a reconquest of Ireland. Force, Temple 
argued, was necessary, because the Irish had intended to “raise strong armies to invade and 
conquer England” as a part of the uprising in 1641.3 Temple’s work shows an obvious English 
bias in the way he analyzes the events surrounding 1641. Among his claims, Temple asserts that 
the revolt was designed well before it occurred and always included plans to massacre English 
Protestants. He also charges the Irish rebels with an inhuman level of cruelty against their 
helpless English victims. Finally, he rejects any claim that the Irish might have been provoked 
into mutinying, instead accusing the Irish of “endeavor[ing] to raise some ground or belief that 
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they had just cause to enter into so desperate a rebellion.”4 Indeed, he finds the thought of the 
Irish having a just cause to rebel so ludicrous that he mocks the very idea: “[The Irish Catholics] 
speak as if their oppressions might be paralleled to the Isrealitish envassalage [subjection; 
slavery] in the land of Egypt, and their persecutions, for religion equal to those of primitive 
times…”5 The History of the General Rebellion in Ireland was, thus, widely circulated as 
propaganda against the Irish in times of crisis in England.6  
However, in the time since Temple wrote, the blinders of English patriotism have fallen 
away, allowing for a reexamination of the events of the Ulster rising. This reexamination reveals 
that Temple’s description of the events of 1641 is not entirely true. By investigating available 
sources, one sees that the insurrection, though planned, did not have the level of premeditation 
that Temple asserts. Neither were the violent attacks against the English and Scottish settlers in 
Ireland a part of the plan, at least according to the men who originally devised it. Further, 
scrutiny of the years leading up the 1641 rebellion show that the Irish had more legitimate cause 
to fight than Temple gives them. Lastly, investigation of English responses to Irish aggression 
shows that the English were not the innocent, helpless victims that Temple would have readers 
believe. These facts are best evinced by examining the rebellion of 1641 through three main 
stages: provocation, premeditation, and pandemonium.  
Provocation: the conditions of Ireland in the years leading up to 1641 
In the seventeenth century, land and the Catholic faith were the lifeblood of Ireland, and 
the native Irish gentry were willing to die to preserve them. They perceived James I’s Irish land 
policies as particularly devastating. In 1607, several prominent Catholic landowners were forced 
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to flee Ireland after the imposition of English law and custom.1 Within a decade of their flight, 
James I would confiscate their lands (over 3,800,000 acres in Ulster alone) and redistribute it 
among English and Scottish settlers, Crown officials, the established Anglican Church, and even 
the City of London, whose financial support of James’ Irish plantations was critical. By 1618, 
Ireland was overrun with 40,000 Scottish settlers alone.7 The confiscation and redistribution of 
Irish land was known as the transplantation system. Its purpose, according to Richard Lawrence, 
a radical Baptist officer, was first, “to punish the Irish for rebellion and murder for the [times] 
past,” second, “to settle Ireland for the future,” and third, to protect English interests and subjects 
from “inhuman usage and destruction” at the hands of Irish Catholics.8 It was certainly 
successful in the first regard. The transplantation system slowly stripped the Irish of their rights 
and privileges and their means of making a living.  
This elimination crossed all social and economic class boundaries; it even served to unite 
parties that had traditionally opposed one another. For centuries, the native Irish had not been the 
only inhabitants in Ireland. A separate group also lived in the land, known as the Old English. At 
the time of the rebellion, the common understanding of the term, “Old English” was anyone who 
descended from those who had colonized Ireland, beginning in the period of the Norman 
invasions (the late 12th century) and continuing approximately until the introduction of the 
Protestant Reformation in Ireland.9 At first, this division was primarily historical, racial, and 
demographic, evinced by the settlement patterns of the Old English as opposed to that of the 
Irish. The greatest concentrations of the Old English for centuries had been in the urban counties, 
such as Dublin, Meath, Louth, Kildare, and Kilkenny, where the original Norman settlements 
and the English presence had been strongest.10  
                                                 
1
 The flight of the Irish Catholic lords was likely also precipitated by the failure of a plot formed by Hugh O’Neill, 
Earl of Tyrone, Rory O’Donnell, Earl of Tyrconnell, and Hugh Maguire to capture Dublin Castle in 1607.  
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The Old English were further distinguished from the native Irish in the nature of their 
interests in Ireland and the approaches that the Old English used to further those interests. For 
example, the settlement pattern of the Old English had created a distinctive buffer zone between 
the native Irish and the English government. However, English authorities had ignored years of 
pleas from the Old English for protection from their Irish enemies. As a result, the Old English 
worked to establish a pseudo-independence from the English government by placing themselves 
outside of strict English control while at the same time fighting tensions with the native Irish.11 
With fewer royalist restrictions on their behavior, the Old English were free to solve their 
problems with the Irish in any manner they chose, whether through conflict or reconciliation. 
Crown officials could hardly complain about their withdrawal, for the Old English could still 
point to their role as a safeguard for the English authorities as a mark of their continued loyalty. 
For these reasons, there was no love lost between the Old English and the native or 
“mere” or “Gaelic” Irish. Each was highly suspicious of the other and held the other race in 
contempt, and the animosity between the two was not lost on onlookers. Even as late as 1614, 
government official, George Carew, remarked that “the Old English race despised the mere Irish, 
accounting them a barbarous people, void of civility and religion.”12 The Irish equally loathed 
the Old English. In the years surrounding 1641, it was not uncommon to hear them say that the 
“Old English of the Pale [the area where the Old English were most heavily 
concentrated]…deserved to be hanged as well as the other English.”13 Each group regarded the 
other, across their differences, with antagonism. 
Over time, however, the lines between a native Irish identity and an Old English one 
blurred, and unsurprisingly, considering the proximity in which the two groups lived and the 
length of time that they cohabited the island. Intermarriage, shared educational institutions, and a 
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shared Catholic faith drew the two races culturally together.14 These similarities explain why the 
New English, especially the government officials, came to regard the Old English with disdain. 
They viewed the Old English as having abandoned their English heritage to become something 
no better than a native Irishman instead. In turn, these views explain why the Old English, who 
had traditionally enjoyed more royal favor than the Irish, began to see their privileges disappear 
as well. The authority, confidence, and influence that the Old English had held for so long was 
gradually transferred to the New English through their displacement of the Old English lords in 
government offices and the support of the English administration.15 Soon they began to 
experience the same political and economic discrimination as the native Irish. Their shared bonds 
of Catholicism, culture, history, and political discrimination led the Old English and the Gaelic 
Irish to put aside their differences and ally in the years of the rebellion. However, it is significant 
to note that both parties were very clear on the nature of their cooperation as an alliance, not as a 
union of the two groups.16 Nonetheless, the common cause of the Old English and the native 
Irish united them in a group now known as the “Confederate Catholics,” who would in turn 
become the “Confederation of Kilkenny.” The matter was settled with the Confederate Catholics 
official view that the problems of Ireland and the Irish belonged to all who were born there.17 
From then on, the Old English and the native Irish became virtually indistinguishable, as they 
were all native to Ireland. It is no wonder, then, that the same rage, resentment, and utter 
desperation began to build up in the hearts of all Catholic landowners against the flood of 
Protestant (or New English) settlers.  
Their reaction is hardly unreasonable, as they watched helplessly while their compatriots’ 
land was also dispossessed and their own positions deteriorated with the unrestricted tide of 
incoming Protestant settlers. Aiden Clarke, in his essay, “The Genesis of the Ulster Rising of 
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1641,” notes that the lords feared a repressive change in the Crown’s official attitude towards 
Catholics and Catholicism. He credits the radical shift in the balance of political power in Ireland 
that occurred as a direct result of the influx of Protestant settlers as the basis of their fears.18 
Interestingly, Catholics still outnumbered Protestants by about fifteen to one, even as late as 
1641.19 However, the Irish lords’ fears of anti-Catholic rhetoric and legislation were justified not 
because of the Protestants demographic power but their economic and political power. Between 
1603 and 1633, Protestant settler interest came to dominate political administration, and by 1641, 
nearly 40% of profitable land in Ireland was possessed by English or Scottish landowners.20  
With this dramatic increase in Protestant power in Ireland, the cries for regulations 
against Catholics began to grow louder and more numerous. Some even went so far as to label 
the Catholic Church antichristian. George Downham (or Downame), the bishop of Derry from 
1617-1634, wrote a two volume book explaining how and why the Pope was the antichrist. In it, 
he said, “recusant papists ought not to be favoured or spared…And surely if not their persons, 
then much less ought their Anti-christian religion…be tolerated in the church of Christ. For what 
fellowship can there be between light and darkness?”21 By declaring all Catholics to be heretics, 
worse, servants of the antichrist, Downham essentially said that anything done to hinder them 
was not only in defense of the true “church of Christ,” but a sacred and moral duty upon all 
Protestants. Other sources indicate that Downham’s speech reflected such widely asserted beliefs 
among Protestants in Ireland and England that he did not even fear repeating it to the king, 
whose Catholic sympathies were widely known.22 These sympathies ensured that Protestants in 
England and Ireland held the state responsible for saving the Catholics from their false faith, 
“which hazardeth the souls of those it seizeth upon.”23 Consequently, English officials in Ireland 
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responded to this immense popular pressure by extending the plantation policy and levying 
recusancy fines (charges imposed on Catholics who refused to attend Anglican services).24  
While the effects of the plantation policies and the anti-Catholic rhetoric that 
predominated in the years before 1641 provided the key motives for the Irish to rebel, the future 
of the leaders rebellion, such as Sir Phelim O’Neill and Lord Connor MacGuire, had their own 
personal reasons. Individual debt was a significant factor for several of them. Randall 
MacDonnell, the earl of Antrim and one of the earliest lords to push for rebellion, was £50,000 in 
debt, and considering that his estate only produced an annual income of £6,000, it is no wonder 
that he wished to see more of the profitable land in Ireland return to Irish hands. Sir Phelim and 
Lord MacGuire were also in debt, though they do not appear to have owed as much as 
MacDonnell.25  
More infuriating for the lords’ than the new economic system produced by the plantation 
system were the special rules that accompanied it. These rules prevented the Irish from 
competing in the new market on the same footing as their Protestant counterparts, making it even 
more difficult for them to overcome their debt. For example, the Irish were not allowed to 
purchase land from English or Scottish landowners or each other.26  Simply put, the law forbade 
the Irish from purchasing land period. This restriction greatly impeded the Irish from paying off 
their debts, increasing their indebtedness. At some point, it became inevitable that the debt would 
so great that they would be forced to sell their land, and only Protestant settlers were allowed to 
purchase their land. Policies such as these not only led to the Protestant acquisition of 40% of 
profitable land but also heavily influenced the Irish leaders’ decision to rebel.   
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The Catholic gentry had reasons had reasons that were not based on material 
consideration, however. Some truly seemed to have been genuinely concerned with improving 
conditions for Irish laymen across the country: Hugh MacMahon of Monaghan, for example, 
stated that the fundamental purpose of rebelling was to liberate all Irish men from the “bondage 
and slavery” of the English.27  However, even MacMahon’s noble aspirations may well have 
been second thought. Owen Connolly, MacMahon’s foster brother (who would later betray the 
lords’ plot to the English authorities), reported that MacMahon originally enlisted in the 
conspiracy out of fury at being slighted by a New English (as the Protestant settlers and officials 
were called) justice of the peace.28 Apparently, resentment among the Irish landowners against 
the pretentious New English was common. Thus, monetary issues and native pride were arguably 
more important in ensuing the Catholic gentry’s commitment to the uprising than the general 
plight of the native Irish. 
Time was running out for the Catholic landowners. If they had any hope of holding on to 
the two main components of their livelihood and, more importantly, their identity, as formed by 
land and religion, the Irish lords were going to have to act and act quickly. Therefore, when their 
neighbors, the Scots, successfully negotiated new terms of religious and political freedoms with 
the Crown in 1640, the Irish gentry came to a decision.29 The drain of their lifeblood required 
action.  
Premeditation: the planning of the Ulster uprising 
On the weekend of October 22/23, 1641, astonishment raced throughout the English 
commonwealth of Ireland as a small group of discontented native Catholic landowners in Ulster 
challenged English Protestant control “in hopes to rescue themselves from subjection to the 
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crown of England.”30 The result was what one anonymous author reported as, “the most 
barbarous and bloody rebellion that was ever known,” and it would last until 1653.31 The plan 
was for Owen Roe O’Neill, Lord Connor MacGuire (the second baron of Enniskillen and 
nephew of Owen Roe), Philip MacHugh O'Reilly, Turlough O'Neill, and Hugh MacMahon of 
Monaghan to recruit as many of their friends and neighbors as possible (or at least those present 
in the counties in which they resided) in an effort to regain confiscated Catholic lands, rights, and 
privileges. Equally important was their supplementary goal to regain greater religious toleration 
for the Catholic faith. They were successful in garnering support; sources indicate that Sir 
Phelim O’Neill (brother of Turlough O’Neill) Patrick Madder O’Donnelly, and even members of 
the Catholic clergy became involved in the plot as well.32 With the support of their fellow 
Irishmen for the plot, they were to "send for the Irish in the low-countries and Spain"33 and let 
them know the agreed upon date and time so that those Irish could "be over with them by that 
day, or soon after, with supply of arms and ammunition."34 On the chosen day, all the 
participants were to ride out and gather as many arms as they could muster in their own land 
before arriving in Ireland.  
By also including the Irish who lived abroad in the rebellion, the leaders hoped to catch 
international attention, particularly of France and Spain (the two most powerful Catholic nations 
in Europe at the time). They did have solid reasons for this hope. France had showed special 
interest in Ireland ever since the union of the Scottish and English kingdoms in 1603, which 
increased the power of England’s threat to French interests. Spain went even further in its 
interest; in 1601, Philip III had sent expeditionary forces to aid in Hugh O’Neill’s uprising in an 
attempt to diver English attention and resources from the Netherlands. Therefore, the Irish 
leaders sent diplomatic envoys to both countries early in the rebellion, hoping to gain external 
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recognition of their actions. They were refused. Neither France nor Spain even accepted the Irish 
diplomats or granted them ambassadorial status, for it posed too many problems for France and 
Spain with other European nations at that moment in time.35 In the end, the native Catholic 
leaders could only rely on themselves. 
Of all the Irish gentry involved, there appear to have been two main leaders: Owen Roe 
O’Neill and Sir Phelim O’Neill. Owen Roe was the nephew and successor of the infamous Hugh 
O’Neill, earl of Tyrone, who used his military prowess and the centralization of his regional 
power base to unite the northern Irish leaders in opposing English advances during the Nine 
Years’ War (1594-1603) during Elizabeth I’s reign.36 As a young man, Owen Roe served under 
his uncle, and when Hugh fled to Europe, Owen left his homeland in exile and spent half his life 
abroad as a result. However, he observed firsthand the failure of his uncle and how to avoid the 
same mistakes. He would put these lessons in communication, cooperation, and coexistence 
among Ireland’s Catholics to effective use in the rising of 1641. On the other hand, Sir Phelim 
O’Neill, though related to Owen Roe, came to prominence in this new planned uprising through 
a different path. In addition to being a landowner, Sir Phelim served as a trained lawyer, a justice 
of the peace, and a member of the parliament in County Armagh, where he lived.37 Through 
these experiences, Sir Phelim became a savvy politician and was adept at formulating the 
demands of the Irish landed gentry while minimizing their perceived threat to the English. For 
example, if they believed O’Neill’s profession of loyalty to the king, the English might be 
disarmed and violence avoided. 
When this group decided to challenge the English, they determined that their main target 
would be Dublin Castle, one of the central strongholds of English power in the area. Surprise 
would be their greatest weapon, as they hoped for a bloodless coup. This hope was so strong that 
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they did not overlook even the smallest details: the specific day chosen for the attack on Dublin 
(October 23, a Saturday) was a market day. Temple, who lived in Ireland for most of his life, 
commented after the fact that in all of the commotion of a typical market day, “there would be 
less notice taken of [the rebels] up and down the streets.”38 At the same time, they targeted other 
English sites in and around Ulster, including garrisons, forts, and castles. Some of these attacks 
would happen on the eve of the strike on Dublin Castle in order to cut Dublin off from any 
possible aid the next day39. To ensure the best chances for successful take-overs, deception was 
key. For example, Sir Phelim O’Neill wrested control of the Charlemont fort in County Armagh 
from Toby, Lord Caulfield (the governor of the fort) by introducing himself as an uninvited 
dinner guest while his servants used their concealed weaponry to overpower the guards.40 To 
attack Dublin Castle, the Catholic lords decided that they would enlist the aid of several military 
leaders, including Colonel Hugh Byrne, Colonel Richard Plunkett, and Captain Brian O’Neill. 
They would gather as many men under their command as possible and then, as Temple reports, 
“seize on the castle of Dublin, and with the arms found there, arm their soldiers and have them 
ready for any action that should be commanded them.”41 However, it is important to note that the 
plotters explicitly intended to avoid violence; military leaders had instructions to take prisoners 
and treat them with care whenever possible. They were only to engage the English and Scottish 
settlers in combat when not doing so would endanger the Irish.42  
It was a well-thought-out plan, but the lords did not spend years upon years lying in wait 
to pounce upon the hapless English at the first sign of weakness, as Temple claims. Documents 
indicate instead that the chief leaders took the first steps towards developing the Ulster uprising 
as late as February of 1641. 43 But even those steps were hardly steps at all, as even the key 
figures of the revolt were not yet involved. The earliest conspirators assembled again in May, but 
13 
 
did not make much progress. Even as late as August 1641, there was no real plot to speak of.44 
Obviously, the Ulster uprising was hardly the long-standing, sinister plot that Temple alleged. 
The Catholic gentry merely moved to press their advantage in any opportunity in 1641. Chief 
among these advantages were the English presence at Dublin Castle and the recent Scottish 
model of rebellion; the Catholic lords hoped that by securing possession of Dublin Castle and the 
surrounding English posts in the area, they would attain a position of strength from which to 
negotiate their demands with the Crown. This strategy had already proven successful for the 
Scots when they captured Newcastle in August of 1640. 45  They then successfully parlayed with 
Charles I to gain toleration of their religion. (Charles had forcefully tried to implement a new 
English Book of Prayer upon the Scottish Presbyterians through the force of arms.)  
Indeed, the Scots’ capture of Newcastle was important to the Irish revolt. The plotters 
were well aware that the Scots’ success gave them an opportunity to take advantage of the 
resulting political turmoil in England. (Charles I’s continual conflicts with Parliament, which 
stretched back as far as the 1620s, had left England divided as a power struggle between 
Parliament and the King began to emerge.46) There were, however, important differences in the 
circumstances of the Scots’ and those of the Irish lords’. The Irish did not have a homogenous 
population to rouse for support. Instead, they had to contend with the significant presence of 
English and Scottish settlers in Ireland as a result of the plantation system begun by James I. 
Thus, one of the biggest threats to the success of the Irish mission would not come from enemies 
foreign but those domestic.  
Evidence indicates that the Catholic leaders were not ignorant of the precariousness of 
their position. In a letter addressed to Sir William Stewart, a leading Scottish planter in Ulster 
and member of the Irish privy council, four of the O’Neill lords involved in the plan (but not Sir 
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Phelim) assured Stewart that they had no intention “to hurt any of his majesty’s subjects either of 
the English or the Scottish nation either in body or goods.”47 Sir Phelim would go even farther in 
his magnanimity, promising in his proclamation from Dungannon on October 24 that no 
Englishman or Scots would come to harm and that they would receive compensation for any 
damage done to persons or property as a result of the Irish lords’ efforts.48 Had that promise been 
kept by all who took part in the rising, the Irish gentry might well have succeeded in gaining the 
support (or at least maintaining the neutrality) of the English and the Scots in Ireland, and the 
outcome of the rebellion might have been very different. 
Pandemonium: the unleashing of Irish fury and the resulting English reactions 
Unfortunately for Owen Roe, Sir Phelim, and their allies, such a peaceful transition of 
power was not meant to be. Similar to the opening of Pandora’s Box, the Catholic lords 
unleashed a great many evils into the land when they stormed English fortifications in the form 
of the Irish masses, though, if their earlier statements can be trusted, they had no intention of 
causing those evils. These evils, according to Protestant testimonies, included stripping victims 
of their clothes and leaving them to freeze to death in the harsh Irish winter, robbing Protestant 
families of their material goods and ransacking their homes for important papers, such as deeds 
to land and statements of Catholics’ debt, torturing English and Scottish alike if they refused to 
reveal where they hid their valuables, etc. etc.49  
What prompted the Irish populace to commit such vicious acts against their Protestant 
neighbors? Economic conditions were poor for all Irish Catholics in 1641, but none were poorer 
than those at the lowest levels of society―craftsmen, laborers, and small farmers. Ireland had 
suffered from political turmoil for several years before 1641, leaving many areas severely 
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economically depressed. Even those areas that had managed to escape the economic downturns 
of those unstable years (such as County Meath) suffered in the years of peace afterwards: the 
flood of poor and landless people into the more prosperous counties quickly exhausted the 
locals’ abilities to meet their needs and the land through incessant tillage.50 With James I’s 
confiscation of Catholic land (and its redistribution into English and Protestant possession), even 
more low-level Irish joined the throng of landless and unemployed drifters. This spike in poverty 
increased the level of Irish debt exponentially, as they were forced to take out loans, often at 
excessive interest rates, from their Protestant neighbors. These neighbors would subsequently 
become their landlords as well, a fact that could have only rubbed salt into the native Irishmen’s 
raw wounds. When these debts were combined with poor harvests and scarcity of resources 
throughout Ireland in 1641, sectarian and nationalistic tensions became dangerously brittle. 51 
Certain attitudes held by the more prosperous Protestants could not have helped to ease this 
tension either: for them, a common explanation for the state of their Irish neighbors was in their 
work ethic (a product of their Catholic faith). One witness reported, “The Irish [were] well 
known to be a people both proud and envious…they [were] for the most part ignorant and 
illiterate, lazy and poor, and [would] rather beg than work.”52 These words were not exactly the 
kind that one would want lingering in the memories of those “proud and envious” people when 
the law of the land was thrown into disarray.  
Economic disparities were not the only reason that the Ulster uprising produced an 
unintended level of violence. Evidence suggests that the Catholic lords overestimated the extent 
of their control over their territories. For example, Sir Phelim O’Neill’s authority was primarily 
over County Armagh. Though his proclamation from Dungannon makes it clear that he wanted 
his men to treat the English and Scot settlers alike with clemency, the depositions of Protestant 
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witnesses indicate that the Irish laymen showed a special hostility to English colonists.53 Given 
the state of the Irish economy and the attitudes of the more prosperous English towards their 
Irish neighbors, the selective enmity of O’Neill’s men is hardly surprising. Another part of the 
lords’ loss of control resulted from their failure to capture Dublin Castle as planned. With the 
central target of their operation still in British hands, the lords’ could not adequately coordinate 
their attacks. Even a passing study of military history shows that an uncoordinated, undisciplined 
army is a rabid army, and the Irish were no different. The failure to capture Dublin meant that the 
uprising spread across Ireland in the form of unorganized, local raids.54  
In addition, the spread of political thought questioning Catholics’ obligations to a 
heretical king also helped to destabilize the Catholic lords’ control over their men. Conor 
O’Mahony, an Irish Jesuit who taught at the university in Evora during the rebellion, wrote his 
work, Disputatio apologetica de Iure Egni Hiberniae pro Catholicis Hibernis adversus haeretics 
Anglos. Accessit eiusdem authoris ad eosdem Catholicos exhortation, in 1645.55 In Disputatio 
Apologetica, O’Mahony undermined the previous statements of the leaders of the rebellion, who 
had been staunchly proclaiming their continued loyalty to Charles II and their recognition of his 
legitimate authority over Ireland. Obviously, the context in which those statements were 
delivered meant that English Protestants would have inherently regarded them with suspicion. As 
a result, the Catholic gentry were particularly intent on demonstrating the sincerity of their 
claims through their humane treatment of the English and Scottish settlers. Thus, when 
O’Mahony denied the legitimacy of the Stuarts as the kings of Ireland, and more importantly, 
endorsed the annihilation of English “heretics,” the lords of the rebellion were hard pressed to 
control their men or reconcile O’Mahony’s proclamations with their earlier avowals.56 
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One should expect that the Catholic Church would have an opinion on the rising. After 
all, the lay lords claimed that they fought for the benefit of the church and not just themselves. 
The question then becomes, “What was the Church’s level of involvement?” Furthermore, when 
O’Mahony challenged the legitimacy of the Stuart kings, did he reflect a common view in the 
position of the Catholic churches, or was O’Mahony a lone voice in the wilderness?  
The Catholic Church was clearly involved in the rebellion early on and in a myriad of 
ways. For the most part, it played a constructive role. The most significant actors (lords, bishops, 
gentry, and clergy) in the Ulster revolt formed what became known as the Confederation of 
Kilkenny. In 1642, the Confederation drafted a constitution for the Catholic state of Ireland. In 
this constitution, the power of the church over the goals, methods, and actors of the rebellion is 
seen in the three articles that refer to it. The first article declared that the primary objective of the 
uprising was to restore “the privileges and immunities [conceded to the Catholic Church] 
according to the great charter…of King Henry III.”57 In the second article, the Confederation 
created a council with the “power and authority to do and execute all manner of advancement of 
the catholic cause.” In order to do so, the constitution also granted the council the power to 
oversee and resolve all capital, criminal, or civil matters (except those that pertained to land titles 
and/or rights).58 Finally, the Catholic Church settled its own score with the established Anglican 
Church.  
Those grievances were long standing immediately after the Protestant Reformation 
arrived Ireland, the confiscation of the Catholic Church’s land and its redistribution to the 
established Anglican Church soon followed. The clergy who formed part of the Confederation of 
Kilkenny intended to reverse those acts through the last article of the constitution. In the course 
of the rebellion, any possessions of the “protestant[s], in right of their respective churches, or 
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their tenements… [would be] taken, and construed as the possession of the catholic[s] and their 
tenements respectively.”59 The Catholic Church knew that the uprising represented its greatest 
opportunity to reverse its steady marginalization by the influx of Protestant settlers and their anti-
Catholic policies.  
The language of the constitution from the Confederation of Kilkenny would lead one to 
believe that the Catholic Church aggressively pursued the destruction of Protestants in Ireland. 
However, much like the lay lords who initially planned the rebellion, the Church knew that 
violent measures against the English and Scottish settlers would do more harm than good. For 
that reason, the majority of Catholic clergy played a moderating role throughout the revolt by 
upbraiding their congregations for any unnecessary violence or cruelty against the Protestants 
and by trying to protect fleeing Protestants from death and destruction. Several witnesses from 
the time reported that they survived only because of the intervention of different Catholic priests. 
These priests, at times, saved the Protestant refugees from undisciplined Irish military members, 
or at other times, provided the Protestants with provisions after their narrow escape from 
danger.60 Clearly, men like O’Mahony shared some thoughts with the overall body of Catholic 
clergy but advocated a more extreme approach.  
Despite the Catholic clergy and rebel leaders’ attempts to protect the Protestants, it is 
undeniable that the Irish committed atrocious crimes against the English settlers. Hundreds of 
people died as a result of the uprising. According to an anonymous author who reported on the 
rebellion some years later, “multitudes of miserable English” were forced to “flock together in 
cities, towns, and castles, leaving their…personal estates to the mercy of [the Irish].”61 Such 
accounts offer some support for Temple’s condemnation of the rebels in his History.  
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However, the English struck back, hard, and with unspeakable inhumanity. Oliver 
Cromwell led the campaign to force Ireland to submit to complete English control. In his report 
to the Speaker of the House of Commons following his capture of Drogheda (the last main 
pocket of Irish resistance), Cromwell discussed his brutal tactics with a chilling, practical 
reasoning. In order to “prevent the effusion of blood for the future,” Cromwell ordered his men 
to set fire to the St. Peter’s Church in Drogheda, where approximately one hundred Irish rebels 
had fled to in order to escape his army. Being “in the heat of action,” Cromwell was moved by 
nothing, not even the scream of a man as he cried, “God confound me; I burn, I burn.”62 The 
burning of the church was an afterthought, though; Cromwell had forbidden his men from 
sparing the residents of Mill-Mount, a town nearby where rebels had sought shelter on account of 
its excellent defenses, the night before. The defenses did not do much: Cromwell reported that 
his soldiers put over 2,000 people to death, yet the sword proved to be a tool of mercy in his 
hands. Those who managed to escape it were condemned to starvation or forced labor in 
Barbados.63  
The severity of Cromwell’s actions gave even the English pause. In 1649, Cromwell was 
called before the House of Commons to explain his actions. Ever the military man, his reasons 
were short and simple: for God and country. The rebellion had “imbrued [the rebels’] hands in so 
much innocent [English] blood… [which was] satisfactory grounds to such actions.” In addition, 
the Irish had grown “so insolent that…the Protestants were thrust out of the great church called 
St. Peter’s, and they had public mass there.”64 In this statement, one sees how the conflicts 
between the English and the Irish, though initiated as a struggle for economic and political 
privileges, devolved into bitter sectarian divisions. The Irish forced the Protestants out of the 
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church for their mere identity as Protestants. In return, Cromwell slaughtered the Irish for 
expressing their Catholic faith.  
To the English authorities’ credit, they appear to have sensed the danger in leaving Irish-
English relations in the state brought on by Cromwell’s actions. After the rebellion was 
suppressed, a commentator reported that English officials tried to bridge the gap between English 
and Irish residents through a policy of official clemency and land restoration. According to this 
anonymous author, “the English government did not inflict national punishments for those 
national crimes…but on the contrary, restored nearly five million of English acres of land, to the 
Irish papists.”65 There were stipulations, however. A declaration by the Lord Deputy of Ireland 
and his council in 1655 ordained that any Irishman who hoped to submit a claim for this land had 
to essentially submit to a background check to determine their level of involvement in the 1641 
rebellion.66 Furthermore, when the English authorities decided to restore land to the Irish, 
sources report that they made sure to keep a standing Protestant army in Ireland, to put all civil 
and military power into the hands of English Protestants, and to “insert a clause…not to dispose 
the considerable offices of trust, except to such as were de stirpe Anglicana [of the Anglican 
race, emphasis original].”67 The English clearly had no intention of allowing the influential 
leaders of Ireland anywhere near social or political power again. Thus, in a sense, the Catholic 
lords were both successful in accomplishing the goals of their rebellion and thwarted in their 
efforts at the same time.  
While the actions of the lords’ clearly improved the lot of the native Irish multitudes, the 
same could not be said for the leaders themselves. The main reason that the plot to take control 
of Dublin Castle failed was because the Catholic lords were betrayed just prior to the attack. On 
the eve of the assault on Dublin, Owen Connolly (or O’ Connolly), a poor tenant farmer, 
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divulged the plot to the Lord Justice at the time, Sir William Parsons.68 Connolly swore that his 
foster brother, Hugh Oge MacMahon of Monaghan, had summoned him to aid in the takeover of 
Dublin Castle and that he had tried to talk MacMahon out of the plot. When he failed to persuade 
MacMahon, Connolly approached Sir William out of great “faith and loyalty” to the Crown “to 
his own danger” and warned him of the impending attack. Connolly’s actions earned a glowing 
report from Temple, who argued that it was only by his actions that “there [was] yet hope left us 
of deliverance of this state and kingdom, from the wicked purposes of those conspirators.”69 
When the element of surprise disappeared, the lords’ lost their chance to gain Dublin Castle and, 
thus, their ability to emulate the Scots’ negotiation with Charles I. In the aftermath, everyone 
who was suspected of colluding with the plot and/or the plotters was rapidly arrested and 
imprisoned.70 After the rebellion was permanently put down in the late 1640s, many were 
subsequently tried in England and convicted of treason. For example, Temple spent a significant 
portion of his History covering the trial of Lord MacGuire.  
One wonders what motivated Connolly to turn. While Nicholas P. Canny (in Making 
Ireland British, 1580-1650) speculates that perhaps it was because he had recently converted to 
Protestantism,71  it is far more likely, as Temple argued, that Connolly hoped by his actions to 
gain “some mark of his majesty’s most royal bounty, which [would] largely extend to him and 
his posterity.” 72 This bounty, as Temple reports, came in the form of £500 upfront and £200 
pension annually until he could be allotted inheritable land of greater value and would have been 
an irresistible siren’s call to a poor tenant farmer.73 
Though the failure to capture Dublin proved a major setback for the Irish lords’ plans, 
they were not yet defeated. Instead they again took advantage of the political situation in 
England to try to negotiate with the Crown from a position of strength. Charles I was still reeling 
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from his embarrassing defeat at the hands of the Scots in 1639-1640 when the Catholic lords’ 
launched their own rebellion in 1641. 74 In response, Charles I called parliament (now known as 
the Long Parliament) into session to raise the troops and funds he needed to put down the 
rebellion. But the Long Parliament refused, and as a result, England slid into civil war between 
the royalists and the parliamentarians between 1641 and 1643. The so-called “War of the Three 
Kingdoms” was a golden opportunity for the native Irish leaders to demonstrate their loyalty to 
the English Crown, and as early as 1643, the Catholic gentry called for a temporary truce.75 
These actions are hardly those of men who planned for the ultimate destruction of England, as 
Temple alleged in his History. In fact, it appears that the Irish, at least the Irish lords, were 
genuine when they said they only wanted to protect themselves from the further marginalization 
of their land and religion.  
That is not to say that the Catholic leaders naively intended to put themselves at further 
risk of death and destruction. They were very canny in the way they offered their assistance. As 
Jerrold I. Casway wrote, the Irish leaders, “wanted to demonstrate [their] loyalty and reconcile 
[their] differences with the king,” but it was going to cost Charles I restoration of “civil and 
religious liberty” for the Catholics.76 While Temple likely would have labeled these demands 
treasonous and heretical, it appears that Charles I did not feel the same. Casway further reports 
that Charles I was more than willing to mend relations with his Catholic subjects through well-
timed compromises and discreet negotiations.77 With a civil war before him, Charles I would had 
to have been mad, arrogant, foolish, or all three, to turn away any potential allies, though, 
granted, it did mean balancing reconciling with his Catholic subjects while not offending his 
Protestant subjects.  
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Once again, had things gone according to the Irish gentry’s plans, the full realization of 
their goals might have been possible. Unfortunately for them, neither they nor the royalists took 
Oliver Cromwell’s military skill (or his calculated attitude of victory at all costs, depending on 
who is describing him) seriously enough. Cromwell emerged on the side of the parliamentarians 
in the civil war, who intended to settle the Irish question once and for all. Following Elizabeth I’s 
model (which had proven successful in Ireland before), the parliamentarians sought to gain rapid 
victory in Ireland in order to not allow their enemies time to mobilize. To that end, the Long 
Parliament set up a subsidy assessment and a coordinating commission whose purpose was to 
assemble a massive army pulled from all three of the British kingdoms (England, Scotland, and 
Ireland). With this ready supply of men, and more importantly, cash, Cromwell began his Irish 
campaign.78 The result was bloodshed like that evinced by Cromwell’s capture of Drogheda but 
implemented on a national scale. Even important leaders warned against the conflict. Shortly 
before his death in 1649, Owen Roe O’Neill implored James Butler, the Marquis of Ormond and 
the royal representative in Ireland, not to confront Cromwell. O’Neill argued that directly 
engaging Cromwell with the small number of troops that Ormond possessed would “produce no 
other effect than the loss of your Excellency and consequently of the whole kingdom.”79 He 
fervently reminded Ormond that the Irish army was the only force standing between Cromwell 
and Ireland’s fall into the hands of Parliament. By August 1650, the Irish Catholic army lost both 
their faith in Ormond as a commander and their will to continue fighting. 80 The Cromwellian 
conquest of Ireland was complete.  
Concluding Remarks: the authenticity of Temple’s evaluation of the Ulster rebellion 
The fall of Ireland into Parliament’s hands provokes one to assess the veracity of 
Temple’s accusations against the Irish. Among his most radical allegations, Temple claimed that 
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raising “strong armies to invade and conquer England” was a part of the original plan for the 
Ulster uprising.81 If that had truly been the case, the Catholic lords would not have called a truce 
when England descended into civil war between 1641 and 1643 nor offered to fight on the side 
of the king. Had the Irish actually have had any desire to raid England and take control, there 
would have been no better time to do so than when its military and political unity was shattered. 
In fact, the Ulster rebellion was a movement for religious liberation and political and economic 
freedoms, not aggressive expansion. Temple also maintained that the Catholic lords had spent 
years planning the Ulster uprising. If the Irish gentry had truly intended to raid and occupy 
England, then such protracted planning would have been essential, for England was an 
economically, politically, and militarily powerful nation, especially compared to Ireland. 
However, the leaders of the rebellion did not even conceive a serious plan for the rebellion until 
one month prior to the event. That fact, when combined with the religious, political, and 
economic nature of the rebellion, refutes any reasonable claim that the Irish schemed for any 
great length of time or wanted to overthrow England. 
Similarly, when Temple denies that the Irish lords had any provocation for their 
rebellion, he conveniently overlooks the position that the lords found themselves in prior to 
October 1641. James I’s confiscation of Catholics’ land, the transplantation system, and the 
passage of discriminatory laws against Catholics that prevented them from equally participating 
in the Irish economy worked to strip the Irish of the land that they had lived on and worked for 
centuries. In addition, the anti-Catholic rhetoric that was passed down to the English settlers 
from the Anglican clergy created a hostile atmosphere toward a fundamental source of the 
Irishmen’s identity: their religion. These factors, combined with the economic depression that 
ravaged Ireland in the decade before the 1641 revolt (years in which the level of poverty and 
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debt among all Irish escalated exponentially while their Protestant neighbors enjoyed relative 
prosperity), makes it surprising that the Irish lords and clergy showed as much restraint as they 
did. Obviously, Temple’s heritage as an English Protestant official prevented him from even 
trying to understand or empathize with the Irishmen’s plight when they turned to rebellion as a 
last resort. 
However, not all of Temple’s allegations are so easily refuted. In his History, Temple 
charges the Irish with arranging the massacre of English and Scot Protestants from the very 
inception of the rebellion. One can examine the statements of the leaders and see that they do not 
support Temple’s accusation, but an absence of available evidence makes it impossible to tell 
what the leaders truly thought. One can, however, weigh the costs and benefits of the mass 
murders to determine the likelihood of Temple’s claim. Ultimately, the mass murder of 
Protestant settlers undermined the Irish lords’ profession of loyalty to Charles II, losing them 
potential royal support. In addition, the violence invoked the English resentment and retaliation 
that the Catholic lords had hoped to avoid, costing them the bloodless coup they had worked so 
hard to obtain. If the Irish gained any advantages by the bloodshed, they were limited to the 
execution of personal vengeances and the acquisition of support for the revolt from the Irish 
populace. Therefore, it is unlikely that the Irish Catholics would have included widespread 
slaughter of their English and Scot neighbors in their original plan.  
Lastly, Temple accuses the Irish Catholics of an inhuman level of cruelty against their 
hapless Protestant victims. He has some justification for this accusation because the Irish 
populace undeniably committed atrocities against the English and Scot settlers, according to the 
thousands of Protestant depositions. However, Temple’s History does not take into account the 
Cromwellian reconquest and the appalling carnage that accompanied the suppression of the 
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uprising, particularly the capture of Drogheda in 1649. If Cromwell’s capture of Ireland for the 
Long Parliament did not exceed the attacks committed by the Irish, then it matched them to say 
the very least. Thus, Temple’s accusation is in one sense very true; the Irish did commit dreadful 
acts of violence against their Protestant neighbors, but the capture of Drogheda shows that the 
English had no qualms in using similar cruelty.  
Temple’s work was influential in shaping official English foreign policy concerning 
Ireland, the general English audience’s understanding of the Irish, and the resulting stereotypes 
of the Irish for many years. The tragedy is that such a misleading work became so influential. 
The danger is that it could continue to mislead. Taken out of its context, Temple’s work gives a 
heavily biased and incomplete understanding of the Ulster rebellion in 1641. However, when 
carefully examined within its context, The History of the General Rebellion in Ireland is an 
invaluable source for studying any number of historical subjects (the transplantation system, the 
history of English-Irish relations, the War of the Three Kingdoms, Ireland’s Catholic identity, 
etc. etc.). Examining the Irish rebellion in 1641 in the three phases, provocation, premeditation, 
and pandemonium, especially in relation to Temple’s History, places Temple’s work within its 
historical framework and thus illuminates its potential for the intrigued reader to understand the 
Irish rebellion better.  
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